« ENTENTE CORDIALE » ON SHAREHOLDERS ENGAGEMENT

Engagement in France and UK
What can we learn from each other?

Friday February 14 2014
SHAREHOLDERS ENGAGEMENT IN FRANCE

**Fair Voting Participation**

**Lower opposition**

Source: Proxinvest 2013 report on French 2013 Shareholders meetings
SHAREHOLDERS ENGAGEMENT IN FRANCE

Less resolution rejected

Arkema, EDF, GDF Suez, GEA - Grenobloise d'Electronique et d'Automatismes, Safran (2 resolutions) et Total (5 resolutions) Altamir, Gecina (3), Index Multimedia, Solocal (2), Theolia

Proxinvest opposition rate

Proxinvest recommended to oppose for 43% of the resolutions

Source: Proxinvest 2013 report on French 2013 Shareholders meetings
Less external proposals

INCLUDING: Arkema, EDF, GDF Suez, GEA - Grenobloise d'Electronique et d'Automatismes, Safran (2 resolutions) and Total (5 resolutions) Altamir, Gecina (3), Index Multimedia, Solocal (2), Theolia

Most proposed by the employees or employee shareholders.

Despite Phitrust no one from the SRI community.

Source: Proxinvest 2013 report on French 2013 Shareholders meetings
Obstacles to higher participation rates

1) Excessive proxy voting fees charged by depositary banks

2) Some investors have reduced their reported fiduciary practice by setting high ownership threshold

3) Share-lending preference

4) General herding

A LIKELY COMMON SOURCE: THE CONFLICTED AND OVERWEIGHT UNIVERSAL BANKING MODEL
TOTAL 2013 AGM : a demonstration of investors incoherence ?

The five external proposals of the Total Workers Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposal</th>
<th>Approval rate</th>
<th>Proxinvest / ECGS Recommendation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creation of a Board Ethics Committee, independent from Management</td>
<td>2,79%</td>
<td>For</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remunération of MDs and employees to be linked to industrial safety indicators</td>
<td>3,30%</td>
<td>For</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adoption by Total of the Diversity Label</td>
<td>1,55%</td>
<td>Against</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation of an Employee Director to the Board remuneration Committee</td>
<td>3,08%</td>
<td>For</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of the increased dividend for shareholders registered for more than two years</td>
<td>2,87%</td>
<td>For</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
19 Board proposals passed only thanks to the double voting provision

ACCOR (Directors election, LTI plans), Akka Technologies (options),

Arkema (restricted shares), Gameloft (LTI, withdrawal of the preemptive right, greenshoe),

Ipsos (performance shares), Ingenico (share repurchase plan, private placement of new shares, withdrawal of the preemptive rights),

Kering (discount on capital increase without preemptive rights),

Sodexo (LTI, warrants), Ubisoft (election of a director of the controlling family, contributions in kind)
... a lack of engagement and active ownership

Asset owners and asset managers do not generally use fully their shareholder rights

UNPRI - Principle 2: *We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies and practices.*

Possible actions:
- Develop and disclose an **active ownership policy** consistent with the Principles
- **Exercise voting rights** or monitor compliance with voting policy
- Develop an engagement capability (directly or outsourcing)
- Participate in the development of policy, regulation, and standard setting (such as promoting and protecting shareholder rights)
… lack of shareholder proposals

**File shareholder resolutions** consistent with long-term ESG considerations

- Engage with companies on ESG issues
- Participate in collaborative engagement initiatives
- Ask investment managers to undertake and report on ESG-related engagement

Lack of support for the rare activists (i.e. Phitrust Active Investors mutual fund for a better governance)
Support Phitrust Active Investors initiatives:

- proposals for a split of chairman and CEO roles
- proposals for the abolition of the double voting right provision

*(Reminder: asset managers and non-French investors do not enjoy this double voting provision as shares must be permanently registered)*

Proxinvest additional engagement campaigns:

- tightening the shareholders control over related-party transactions
- integrating of the assistance to the voting execution as a basic service in all custody contracts (no extra fees on the only voting shareholders in line with the ABI, Eurosif, Eumedion, ECGS and Proxinvest proposal).